A C++ proof of concept demonstrating the exploitation of Windows Protected Process Light (PPL) by leveraging COM-to-.NET redirection and reflection techniques for code injection. This PoC showcases bypassing code integrity checks and loading malicious payloads in highly protected processes such as LSASS. Based on research from James Forshaw.
active 2025-03-02 → 2026-01-23 (UTC)
Activity over time
Daily event counts in the loaded window
Line chart, 328 days from 2025-03-02 to 2026-01-23. Pushes: 6 total, peak 6 in a day. Pull requests: 0 total, peak 0 in a day. Issues: 1 total, peak 1 in a day. Comments: 0 total, peak 0 in a day. Stars: 151 total, peak 77 in a day.
- Pushes
- Pull requests
- Issues
- Comments
- Stars
Stars, PRs, issues and forks are under-captured in the later part of this window. GH Archive progressively stopped capturing non-push events during 2026 — −95% or worse by the end of the window. Every series here except Pushes fades for that reason, so a decline above reflects the archive, not this repository. Pushes stay reliable throughout, so read them, and the contributor counts derived from them, as the real signal. Data health has the measurements.
Top contributors
Pushes, PRs, issues, reviews and comments — stars and forks excluded, so this is contribution rather than popularity
Recent activity
Latest issues, pull requests and releases
- Issue#1cookpoo782025-03-06 06:15managed code does not invoked
Totals cover only the window loaded into ClickHouse and count events, not GitHub's lifetime totals — 151 stars here means stars gained during the window, not the repo's star count.